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et al.: FRE and NY Evidence Comparison

RULE 803(7): ABSENCE OF ENTRY IN RECORDS
KEPT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH (6)
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(7) states:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even
though the declarant is available as a witness:
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph (6).
Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda
reports, records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph (6), to prove the
nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of
a kind of which a memorandum, report, record, or data
compilation was regularly made and preserved, unless the
sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness. 1
The language of Rule 803(7) provides that when there is a duty
to record certain business transactions, the omission or absence
of a record may be offered as evidence to show that the event
never occurred. 2 The absence of entry exception to the hearsay
rule may only be applied as long as an adequate foundation is
established pursuant to the provisions of Rule 803(6).3
1. FED. R. EvID. 803(7). See infra note 3.

2. Id. See Bowman v. Kaufman, 387 F.2d 582, 587 n.5 (2d Cir. 1967);
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co. 615 F.2d
470, 476 (8th Cir. 1980) (stating that "Rule 803(7) provides that evidence of
the absence of an entry in records regularly kept is admissible as affirmative
proof of the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter normally recorded.").
3. FED. R. EviD. 803(6). Rule 803(6) provides:
A memorandum report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of
acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the
time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge,
if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it
was the regular practice of that business activity to make the
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the
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In three circuits, courts have held that the following four

criteria must be met: "(1) [the record] must have been made in
the course of a regularly conducted business activity; (2) it must
have been kept in the regular course of that business; (3) the

regular practice of that business must have been to have made the
memorandum; and (4) the memorandum must have been made by
the person with knowledge of the transaction or from information
4
transmitted by a person with knowledge."
In United States v. Robinson, 5 the Second Circuit held that the
evidence was properly excluded because the investigator of the
records "had concluded that the records were 'confused' and
'indefinite'. . . ."; however, the court did not explicitly adopt a
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source
of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate
lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph
includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and
calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
Id.
4. Brodersen, 1995 WL 558592, *20. See Redken Labs, Inc. v. Levin,
843 F.2d 226, 229 (6th Cir.) (stating the four criteria to be met before the
absence of a business record may be admissible under Rule 803(7)), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 852 (1988); see also Igo v. Coachmen Indus., Inc., 938 F.2d
650, 658 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting the four criteria from Redken to analyze
whether repair invoices offered into evidence were hearsay); United States v.
Fawaz, 881 F.2d 259, 266 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Redken in holding that
taxpayer personal balance sheet prepared by third party was admissible,
pursuant to Rule 803(7), in tax evasion prosecution); Paddack v. Dave
Christensen, Inc., 745 F.2d 1254, 1258 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding accounting
firm's audit reports inadmissible under Rule 803(6)); Keogh v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 713 F.2d 496, 499 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that personal
records kept for business reasons may qualify as business records if they are
systematically checked and regularly maintained); cf. In re Custodian of
Records of Variety Distrib., Inc., 927 F.2d 244, 248 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing
the criteria in Redken to hold that a custodian of records will not have the right
to refuse to identify or authenticate business records because he does not have
control or personal knowledge of the particular records but need only be
familiar with the company's recordkeeping practices).
5. 544 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1050
(1978). In Robinson, the court stated that "[t]he absence of a record of an
event which would ordinarily be recorded gives rise to a legitimate negative
inference that the event did not occur." Id.
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test for determining the admissibility of "absence of entry"
6
evidence.
It should be noted that, in addition to the threshold
requirements, 7 the sufficiency of the foundational requirements is
determined by the trial court 8 which may include an examination
of the reliability and trustworthiness of the record, 9 the timeliness
of the record,10 and the qualifications of the witness. 11
Despite momentum to change, New York law differs from the

federal rule regarding the admissibility of the "absence of entry"
in a business record as non hearsay. C.P.L.R. section 4521
provides that a lack of a public record "is prima facie evidence
that the record contains no such record or entry."1 2 However,
6. Id. at 114.

7. These requirements are satisfied when Federal Rule of Evidence
803(6) is established. See infra note 3.
8. Wallace Motor Sales, Inc. v. America Motor Sales Corp,. 780 F.2d
1049, 1060 (1st Cir. 1985) (stating that the evaluation of circumstances
indicating lack of trustworthiness and the adequacy of foundation requirements
are within the discretion of the trial court). See also FED. R. EvID. 104
(preliminary matters of admissibility are within the trial court's discretion).
9. Keogh v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 713 F.2d 496, 500
(relying on the evidence because it corroborates with corresponding entries
made in another document and trusting the evidence because there was no
reason to fabricate entries).
10. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 289, at 500 (John William Strong
ed., 4th ed. 1992) ("Whether an entry made subsequent to the transaction has
been made within a sufficient time to render it within the exception depends
upon whether the time span between the transaction and the entry was so great
as to suggest a danger of inaccuracy by lapse of memory."); Seattle First
National Bank v. Randall, 532 F.2d 1291, 1296 (9th Cir. 1976) (stating that a
bank record not made contemporaneous with the transaction or reasonable time
thereafter was inadmissible).
11. Wallace Motor Sales, 780 F.2d at 1061. (stating "[a] qualified witness
is simply one who can explain and be cross-examined concerning the manner
in which the records are made and kept" and "need not be the person who
actually prepared the record.")
12. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L & R. 4520 (McKinney 1992). Section 4521 states:
A statement signed by an officer ... having legal custody of specified
official records ...

that he has made a diligent search of the records

and has found no record or entry of a specified nature, is prima facie
evidence that the records contain no such record or entry.
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there is no provision the lack of entry in any business record is
admissible as non hearsay. At common law, in People v.
Ebramha,13 the defendant was charged with operating as a
vendor without the requisite vending license. 14 The Department

of Consumer Affairs attempted to introduce evidence that showed
that the records were devoid of any issuance to defendant of such
license. 15 In court stated "[a]bsent the record itself, or the

relevant portion of the record, any reference to the contents of
the record would be hearsay."16 Therefore, the New York
common law excludes the "absence of entry" evidence as
17
admissible hearsay.

However, in People v. Niang, 18 the court chose not to follow

People v. Ebramha and held that the absence of the report is a
common law exception to the hearsay rule and concluded that the
defendant did not have a vending license at time of arrest because

Id.
13. 157 Misc. 2d 217, 596 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Crim. Ct. New York 1992).
14. Id. at 218, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 296.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 222, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 297. See Boor v. Moschell, 55 Hun. 604,
28 N.Y. St. Rep. 594, 8 N.Y.S. 583 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1889). On appeal, the
defendant firm argued that, because the defendant had consistently kept entries
of moneys advanced to it, the absence of such an entry regarding the occasion
in dispute proved the advance was never made. Id. at 584. Unfortunately for
the defendant, the court held that "such evidence has been uniformly regarded
as hearsay in character and should have been rejected by the court." Id. at
604, 28 N.Y. St. Rep. at 595, 8 N.Y.S. at 584; Gravel Products Division of
Buffalo Crushed Stone Corp. v. Sunnydale, Inc., 10 Misc. 2d 323, 325, 171
N.Y.S.2d 519, 522 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1958) (stating that "[s]uch evidence,
completely negative, has uniformly been held to be hearsay in character and
incompetent and irrelevant."); cf. Hotopp v. Huber, 160 N.Y. 524, 530, 55
N.E. 206, 208 (1899) ("[T]he absence of entries of payment in regular books
of account, which, in the regular and ordinary course of business, would
appear, if payment had in fact been made, furnishes some evidence of nonpayment."); White v. Benjamin, 150 N.Y. 258, 44 N.E. 956 (1896) ("The
absence of entries required by commercial usage, especially when transactions
with other partieso ... are duly entered, it is regarded as a competent fact,
whenever the entries themselves, if duly made, would have been competent.").
18. 160 Misc. 2d 500, 609 N.Y.S.2d 1017 (1994).
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no record that one was issued could be found. 19 The Niang court
indicates a trend in New York toward accepting absence of entry
evidence as non hearsay exceptions particularly when the records
at issue are "made and maintained in the regular course
of... business." 20
New York courts have been a little sluggish in following the
Federal Rules of Evidence with regard to the adoption of the
absence of a business entry as admissible non hearsay. However,
judging from the recent Niang court ruling, New York is
progressing toward accepting the absence of a business record as
a hearsay exception as the federal courts have done.

19. Id. at 502, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 1019.
20. Id. See Ebramha, 157 Misc. 2d at 225 n.2, 596 N.Y.S.2d 299 n.2
(citation omitted). The court noted in a foomote that:
It may be that the time is ripe for New York to bring itself in line with
the federal and state courts recognizing a hearsay exception for evidence
of absence of a public record. This Court is of the opinion, however.
that any such reconsideration of New York law should be undertaken by
an appellate court.
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